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Deliberation And Collective Identity Formation1
HUBERT MARRAUD
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«Nous» est performatif; «nous» à sa seule prononciation crée un
groupe; «nous» désigne une généralité de personne comprenant celui
qui parle, et celui qui parle peut parler en leur nom, leurs liens sont si
forts que celui qui parle peut parler pour tous.
(Alexis Jenny, L’art français de la guerre, p.36. Paris: Gallimard,
2011)
Abstract. Deliberation is an argumentative practice in which several parties reason in order to decide the best
available course of action. I argue that deliberation, unlike negotiation, requires a collective agency, defined by
shared commitments, and not merely a plural agency defined by aggregation of individual commitments. Since
the “we” presupposed by this argumentative genre is built up in the course of the deliberation exchange itself,
shaping collective identity is a basic function of public deliberation.
Keywords. Argumentative practice, collective agency, dialogue, identity negotiation, in-group, negotiation,
proposal, public deliberation, social identity.

1. Introduction
I will be concerned here with deliberation as an argumentative, communicational practice, thus
leaving aside deliberation as an exercise of private prudential reasoning (NE. 1140a25-27). As
a communicative practice, deliberation can be either interpersonal communication, within a
reduced group, whose members successively play the role of proponent and opponent and try
to reach a decision, or mass communication, involving mass media, in which the debaters
interact for a larger audience. I will consider both types of public deliberation.
There is consensus that deliberation is a distinctive argumentative practice in which
several parties reason together on how to proceed when they are confronted by a practical
problem or any need to consider taking a course of action, in order to decide the best available
course of action. Deliberation is also the paradigm of argumentation in the public sphere.
Distinctive features of deliberation include that it is neither about propositions nor about offers,
but about proposals for action, (Kock 2007, Ihnen Jory 2016), that audience members must
subjectively compare and balance pro and con arguments (Kock), that pragmatic argumentation
is the prevalent argument scheme (Fairclough 2017, 2018), etc.
Relying on previous work by Luis Vega (2013, 2020), I will explore another distinctive
feature of deliberation; namely, deliberation, unlike other argumentative practices as
negotiation, requires a collective agency, defined by shared commitments, and not merely a
plural agency defined by aggregation of individual commitments. While we can assume that
plural agents are simply there, the same don’t applies to collective agents. I hold that the “we”
presupposed by this argumentative genre is built up in the course of the deliberation exchange
itself. As a consequence, if I am right, shaping collective identity is a basic function of public
deliberation.
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2. Deliberations as a type of dialogue
The interest for the argumentative practice of deliberation comes largely from the fact that,
according to most theorists, deliberation is the paradigmatic form of argumentation in politics,
and more generally in the public sphere. The concept of public sphere comes from Habermas
and designates the social space in which citizens ask for, exchange and receive reasons for
political measures, policies and laws that should be enforced from a wide range of political
perspectives.
The concept of dialogue provides a tool for the classification of the different
argumentative practices. In contemporary dialectic a dialogue is a ruled exchange of arguments
between two or more parties oriented towards the achievement of a shared goal. Therefore, a
particular kind of dialogue is distinguished by its intended goal, by its rules, and by the roles
played by the participants.
To go further into this preliminary definition of dialogue we have to say something
about the purposes and goals of arguing. Purposes belong to the participants; goals belong to
the argumentative context of dialogue. To be precise, purposes belong to the roles played by
the participants, not to the individuals playing them. (A role can be defined as a socially
expected behavior pattern determined by an individual's status in a particular group). The
purpose of the defense attorney is to get her client acquitted; however, it may be the case that
the purpose of Smith, the dishonest defense lawyer of Brown, be to get her convicted.
The proper function of arguing is to present to someone something as a reason for
something else. Hence the primary purpose of the arguer is that the addressee perceives
something as a reason for something else. This primary purpose may be accompanied by other
secondary purposes, such as the addressee adopting a belief, an intention or an attitude as a
consequence of her perceiving something as a reason for another thing.
The common goal of any exchange of reasons, that gives sense to the actions of the
participants, is to critically examine an issue -i.e., or consider the merits and demerits of and
judge accordingly. This general goal can be instrumental for the achievement of further
particular goals, such as: clarifying an issue, solving a difference of opinion, coming to an
agreement, etc. While the general goal and the primary purposes of the participants make it
possible to distinguish argumentative exchanges from other forms of communicative
exchanges, particular goals and secondary purposes make it possible to distinguish one type of
argumentative exchange from another type of argumentative exchange. Thus argumentative
exchanges are classified according to their particular goals and the participants’ secondary
purposes.
An argumentative exchange is a practice, and therefore a rule-governed activity. As
John Rawls writes, the word "practice" is used here as “a sort of technical term meaning any
form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties,
defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure” (1955, fn.1). This system of
rules is externally justified by its capacity to promote the achievement of the rules. In an
exchange there can be different stages, defined by the entitlements and obligations the rules
impose to the participants.
Walton & Krabbe (1995) recognize six basic types of argumentative exchanges or
dialogues: inquiry, negotiation dialogue, information-seeking dialogue, deliberation, and
eristic dialogue. Later Walton has added discovery dialogue as a seventh type of basic dialogue.
This classification is based on three aspects: the initial situation, the participants’ purposes and
the goal of the dialogue.
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Table 1. Types of dialogue
TYPE OF
DIALOGUE
InformationSeeking
Deliberation
Discovery
Eristic
Inquiry
Negotiation
Persuasion

PARTICIPANT’S
PURPOSES
Acquire or Give
Information
Dilemma or Practical Co-ordinate
Goals
Choice
and Actions
Need to Find an
Find and Defend a
explanation of Facts Suitable Hypothesis
Personal Conflict
Verbally Hit Out at
Opponent
Need to Have Proof Find and Verify
Evidence
Conflict of Interests Get What You Most
Want
Conflict of Opinions Persuade Other Party
INITIAL
SITUATION
Need Information

GOAL OF
DIALOGUE
Exchange Information
Decide Best Available
Course of Action
Choose Best
Hypothesis for Testing
Reveal Deeper Basis of
Conflict
Prove
(Disprove)
Hypothesis
Reasonable Settlement
Both Can Live With
Resolve or Clarify
Issue

These are the basic types of dialogue; in addition, there are mixed types of dialogue that
combine many stages corresponding to different basic types. Furthermore other authors have
described other types of basic dialogues, such as exploratory dialogue (Mercer, 2004): an
exploratory dialogue starts from the need to delimit a standpoint, the purpose of the participants
is the joint exploration of the scope and consequences of this standpoint, to reach an agreement
on its definition and scope.
A related, though different, concept to that of dialogue type is that of activity type,
which van Eemeren and Houtlosser define as:
conventionalized practices whose conventionalization serves, through the
implementation of certain genres of communicative activity the institutional needs
prevailing in a certain domain of communicative activity (2010, p. 139).2
In turn, they define, quoting Fairclough, genres of communicative activity as socially ratified
way of using language in connection with a particular type of social activity (Ibid.). Thus,
presidential debate, general debate in parliament and Prime Minister’s Question Time are
activity types of the genre of communicative activity deliberation.
A general classification of activity types is based on four factors: initial situation,
starting points, means of argumentation and criticism, and possible outcome. These four factors
correspond to the four stages of critical discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation and
conclusion). An additional feature, that occupies a prominent place in Isabela Fairclough’s
account of deliberation, as we shall see, is that each activity type can be associated with some
speech events on the basis of careful empirical observation of argumentative practice (van
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2005, p. 384).
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Table 2
Some genres of communicative activity (Lewinski, 2010, p. 57).
GENRES OF INITIAL
COMMUNI SITUATION
CATIVE
ACTIVITY

PROCEDURAL
ARGUMENTATION
AND MATERIAL MEANS AND
STARTING
CRITICISMS
POINTS

POSSIBLE
OUTCOME

Adjudication 3rd party
dispute
with
jurisdiction
to decide

Largely explicit
codified rules

Settlement of
the dispute by
sustained
decision 3rd
party (no return
to initial
situation)

Deliberation Mixed
disagreement
dispute; 3rd
party with
jurisdiction
to decide

Largely implicit
intersubjective
rules; explicit and
implicit
concessions on
both sides

Mediation

Conflict at
deadlock; 3rd
party
intervening
without
jurisdiction
to decide
parties
conflict

Implicitly
enforced
regulative rules;
no explicitly
recognized
concessions

Argumentation
conveyed in would-be
spontaneous
conversational
exchanges

Negotiation

Conflict of
interests;
decision up
to the parties

Semi-explicit
constitutive rules;
sets of conditional
and changeable
explicit
concessions

Argumentation
incorporated in
exchanges of offers,
counteroffers and other
commissives

Explicitly established
concessions;
argumentation from
facts and concessions
interpreted in terms of
conditions for the
application of a legal
rule
Argumentation
defending incompatible
standpoints in critical
exchanges

Resolution
difference of
opinion for (part
of) 3rd party
audience (or
confirmed return
to initial
situation)
Mutually
accepted
conclusion by
mediated
arrangement
between
conflicting
parties (or
provisional
return to initial
situation)
Conclusion by
compromise
parties as
mutually
accepted
agreement (or
return to initial
situation)

To sum up, deliberation appears as a type of basic dialogue, in which the shared commitment
to a goal arises from a situation in which several agents must jointly choose from several
alternatives, that either may be given in advance, or may be built in the course of the dialogue.
Agents examine the issue, asking for, giving and appraising reasons in order to determine
which is the best available course of action. To understand what is meant here by “the best
available decision” we need some details about the initial situation, the aim of the exchange
and the purposes of the participants. In an archetypical deliberation, participants don’t start
from previously taken positions and try to make the others embrace them. When this happens,
there is a conflict of opinions and the result is rather a persuasion dialogue.
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Even if one of the participants may have an initial preference for some particular
alternative, her role is not to defend it but to collaborate with the other participants in examining
the pros and cons of the available options in order to take a joint decision. The rules of a
particular type of deliberation can assign the defense of some particular option to some of the
participants, but this obligation must be understood from the shared commitment of jointly
examining all the available options. Assigning to each participant the defense of a different
option can be an efficient way to ensure that the group examines in a fair and unbiased manner
the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Therefore, in a deliberation dialogue the best
policy is the best policy for us, for the deliberative group as a whole.
Thus, deliberation does not start from a conflict of opinions or interests, but from the
need to find a joint solution for a common problem, and this feature differentiates deliberation
from both persuasion and negotiation, making it more akin to inquiry. From the point of view
of the nature of the question at stake, a distinction is usually drawn between three forms of
reasoning and argumentation. When it is a matter of fact, argumentation is factual, when it is a
matter of value, argumentation is valuational, and when it is a matter of choice, argumentation
is practical. According to this classification, in deliberation argumentation is practical while in
in inquiry argumentation is factual.

3. Deliberation, proposals and weighing values
Most contemporary treatments of deliberation have two main sources. Walton & Krabbe’s
(1995) model of deliberative dialogue is one of them; the other is Christian Kock’s (2007)
analysis of political debate.
Deliberation, according to Kock (2007) is a distinctive type of argumentation characterized
by five interrelated features:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

It is about proposals for action, not about propositions that may have a truth value.
There may be good arguments on both sides.
Neither the proposal nor its rejection follows by necessity or inference.
The pros and the cons generally cannot be aggregated in an objective way.
Eventual consensus between the debaters is not a reasonable requirement.

The first feature defines deliberation as a form of practical argumentation, and it is already
implicit in Walton & Krabbe’s account of deliberation as a type of dialogue. A proposition is
the semantic content of an act of assertion, and as such it can be true or false. A proposal is the
semantic content of a directive or a commisive act, and consequently it cannot be true or false,
but rather more or less convenient. Hence deliberation is no about what is true or false, but
about what is convenient or inconvenient. These are Searle (1975, pp. 354-356) definitions of
assertive, directive and commisive speech acts:
•
•
•

The point or purpose of assertive speech acts is to commit the speaker (in varying
degrees) to something' s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition.
The illocutionary point of directive speech acts in the fact that they are attempts (of
varying degrees) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something.
Commissives are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (again
in varying degrees) to some future course of action.

Kock derives from this feature the next two. Arguments about proposals are arguments about
the positive and negative consequences of an action. As most, if not all, actions have both
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negative and positive consequences, there will often be good arguments in favor and against
one and the same proposal. Moreover if we assume, following the model of deductive logic,
that a proposition is deducible from a set of propositions if and only the truth of these
propositions entails the truth of the former proposition, and then, since a proposal cannot be
neither true nor false, to say that a proposal can (or cannot) be deduced from a set of
propositions is plain nonsense.
The coexistence of good reasons in favor and against a proposal makes weighing a core
constituent of practical argumentation. Kock assumes that in order to evaluate a factual
argument it suffices to examine its premises and their relationship to the conclusion, while the
appraisal of a practical argument (and most probably the appraisal of a valuational argument)
requires balancing its strength with that of the other concurrent arguments. If so, (logically)
good factual argument would be classificatory or qualitative concept, while (logically) good
practical argument would be a topological or comparative argument.
It follows from the above that balancing the strength of two practical arguments consists
in balancing the pros and cons of two courses of action. In order to determine if and to what
extent a consequence of an action is an advantage or a drawback, people resort to such values
as political equality, efficient organization, social justice or individual liberty, that constitute
the warrants that deliberative argumentation relies on.
Value pluralism would not be a major difficulty in deliberation if these values were not
incommensurable, in the sense that there are no common basis for determining, in given
situations, the respective weights of the conflicting commitments. Value pluralism is
superficial if the conflicting values may both be converted into a common denominator; but it
is profound if the arguments relying on the conflicting values are not rankable with respect to
a common denominator of value. As a result, in deliberative argumentation there may be no
objective or intersubjective way to determine which side outweighs the other.
since there is no intersubjectively compelling reasoning determining such choices
(and if there were, they would not be choices), they are in fact subjective. In
deliberative debate over a proposal to go to war each legislator and, ideally, each
citizen, must choose individually (‘subjectively’) which policy to support. This is so
not because ‘truth’ is subjective… but because the values that function as warrants in
deliberation are subjective as well as incommensurable. (Kock, 2007, p. 237).
If weighing of practical arguments is subjective and argumentation is the place where
subjective preferences become intersubjective reasons through public critical scrutiny,
weighing and meta-argumentative weighing fall outside the domain of deliberation. Kock goes
on to conclude that it cannot be expected, not even as a theoretical ideal, neither that
deliberation will lead towards consensus, nor that reaching consensus is the goal of
deliberation. argumentation.
But if not consensus, what could then be the purpose of proponents of different policies
engaging in deliberative debate? Kock holds that the main reason why such debates are
potentially meaningful is that other individuals facing such a choice may hear, consider and
compare the arguments relating to the choice (Op.cit., p.238). This view of deliberation is in
accordance to van Eeemeren and Houtlosser’s account of deliberation as an activity type given.
Thus, deliberation fulfills the function of bringing into light the relevant considerations for
some decision, that then everyone will rank according to their personal criteria.
For Walton & Krabbe, as we have seen, the goal of deliberation is to jointly decide the
best available course of action on a matter of common concern. By contrast, for Kock, the goal
of deliberation is to ensure that those who have to decide individually on a matter of common
interest can access all the relevant information, and in any case the same information. Hence
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the goal of deliberation is to warrant information publicity and accessibility -what is usually
taken to be a regulatory condition for sound deliberation. Moreover, in Kock’s model a third
party is added, so that deliberation, from being a two-role dialogue (proponent and opponent),
becomes a three-role dialogue (proponent, opponent and audience). These differences are
probably due to the fact that Kock, on one side, Walton and Krabbe, on the other side, are
thinking in different species of deliberation. While Kock is probably thinking of
macrodeliberation (remember that Kock deals with political debate as a distinctive domain in
argumentation), Walton and Krabbe’s deliberative dialogue is designed to account for
microdeliberation, a kind of interpersonal deliberation that takes place in small, more or less
bounded, groups.
The nature of political (macro)deliberation, Kock goes on, determines the obligations of
the participants.
1. The debater’s main dialectical obligation is to make motivated comparisons between
contradictory arguments.
2. Often it is not appropriate to try to rebut, refute or deny arguments that contradict one’s
own policy. ‘Appropriate’ in this context means: likely to serve the purpose of the
debate, insofar as the purpose of the debate is not to achieve consensus between the
debaters, but rather to help the third parties in their process of choice.
3. No quantity of good arguments on one side is in itself sufficient to decide the matter. A
comparison of the arguments on the two sides is called for, and if this is not offered,
the third parties have still not been helped in making their own comparisons.

4. Deliberation and argument schemes
Description of deliberation as an argumentative genre by Isabela Fairclough (2017, 2018) is
consistent with the description of deliberation as a type of dialogue by Walton and Krabbe.
Fairclough defines deliberation as a method for critical testing of alternative proposals for
action, designed to enable for rational decision-making. Like Kock, Fairclough focus is on
deliberation in the political field.
Politics is inherently connected with argumentation and deliberation because it is
oriented to decision-making, but also because the political is an institutional order
whose very fabric gives people reasons for acting in particular ways (Fairclough, 2017,
p.243).
However, she expressly points out that in politics, deliberation coexists with negotiation,
adjudication and mediation.
Fairclough’s main contribution is the association of the practice of deliberation with the
use of some particular argumentation schemes. Argumentation schemes are patterns of
reasoning that allow for the identification and appraisal of current and stereotypical forms of
argument in everyday discourse. Although most authors use “current” and “stereotypical” as if
they were equivalent, these two words refer to quite different things. The first, “current,” refers
to the frequency with which these patterns occur in our argumentative practices, a matter for
researchers in argumentative practices. The second, “stereotypical,” refers to the ability of
participants to recognize these patterns. Even if this ability may be fostered by the frequent
occurrence of a form of argument, there is a lot of other factors contributing to the saliency of
an argument scheme.
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I think that the most promising way of understanding argument schemes is as kind of
reasons: «An approach to the specification of meaningful kinds of reasons to construct
arguments from is that of argument schemes, as they have been studied in argumentation
theory» (van Eemeren et al., 2014:640). The connection of reasons to argument is that to argue
is to present to somebody something as a reason for something else, usually for persuading her.
Therefore, anyone who asserts P so C means that P is or expresses a reason for C. When this
assertion is questioned, the arguer can be required to make it explicit that in virtue of which P
is supposed to be a reason for C. A classification of the common answers to this kind of
questions results in a classification of single arguments into argument schemes.
According to Fairclough, deliberation is characterized, among other things, by the prevalent
use of two argument schemes: argument from goals and argument from consequence. Roughly
argument from goals run like this:
- agent S has goal G therefore agent S ought to do A for doing act A contributes to goal
G.
And argument from positive and negative consequence run like this:
- doing A has potential effects E, therefore proposal A is recommended for effects E are
desirable
- doing A has potential effects E, therefore A is not recommended for effects E are
undesirable
Fairclough says that these argument schemes are used in different stages of the deliberative
process. Deliberation typically starts with many agents having a stated goal G in a set of
circumstances C and trying to jointly answer the question, “what should be done?” To do that,
they propose and critically examine possible courses of action to bring about G on the basis of
the knowledge available to them (Fairclough 2018, pp.299-300). Thus, each of these proposals
amounts to an argument from goal. The deliberative process consists of two consecutive stages.
it. The purpose of the first stage is to eliminate unreasonable proposals by examining their
potential consequences, while the purpose of the second stage is to enable non-arbitrary choice
of a better proposal, if several reasonable proposals have withstood criticism. Thus, Fairclough
enriches the description of the argumentation stage in deliberation, specifying their argument
means and criticism and distinguishing two consecutive sub-stages.
At the first stage overriding reasons are considered: when one of the proposals has some
unacceptable consequence, it is ruled out. At the second stage outweighing reasons come into
play: the pros and cons of the surviving proposals are weighed up and their relative merits are
assessed in order to determine which proposal is preferable to other reasonable alternatives.
This weighing is heavily influenced by fundamental differences of interests, purposes and
values, and different ways of interpreting the situation among the debaters. Due to the
dependence on subjective factors -Fairclough points out- deliberation turns almost invariably
to an adversarial process. Fairclough distinguishes unreasonable and reasonable disagreement
in politics. Reasonable disagreements occur when parties have equally good reasons for their
proposals, that are either incomparable or differently weighted or prioritized. In fact, it could
be argued that incomparability is a deeper phenomenon, not directly dependent on differences
of interests and purposes, for the balance involved in this second stage of the deliberative
process is complex and multidimensional, since
Unacceptable consequences include impacts on goals which should arguably not be
undermined (e.g., other agents’ legitimate goals), as well as impacts on arguably nonoverridable ‘deontic reasons’ such as rights and obligations (Searle 2010), arising from
institutional facts (e.g., moral norms, laws, rules, commitments), which should act as
constraints on what agents can reasonably choose to do. (Fairclough, 2017, p. 245).
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The positive and negative effects of an action are of unequal importance and each of them can
vary in intensity. Therefore, disagreement is possible even when we agree in the relative
ordering of values.

5. Proposals and offers
Drawing on the work of Kock, Constanza Ihnen Jory (2016) intends to capture the difference
between deliberation and negotiation as the two main types of dialogue on practical issues (i.e.
about what to do). The fundamental difference is that while deliberative argumentation, as we
have seen, is about proposals, negotiative argumentation is about offers. Besides that, Ihnen
Jory rightly remarks that negotiations -unlike deliberations- not always involve argumentation.
There are three main differences between negotiating (i.e., makings an offer) and
deliberating (i.e. making a proposal), according to Ihnen Jory.
First, when a speaker makes a proposal, she predicates the same collective action of
both speaker and hearer. To make a non-conditional offer, it is sufficient for the speaker to
predicate an action of himself and to make a conditional offer it is sufficient for her to predicate
an action of herself and a different action of the hearer. Eventually in this second case both
actions can be the same, and thus it would be a collective action. In short, to propose is
necessarily to predicate a collective action of speaker and hearer; to make an offer is to
predicate an action from the speaker which may or may not involve mutually bringing it about
with the hearer.
The second difference between making an offer and proposing relates to whose interests
are meant to be served by the action(s) that speaker (and hearer) would be carrying out. When
a speaker makes a proposal, he is committed to the view that the action proposed will further
an interest—goal, objective, preference, etc.—that is shared by both speaker and hearer. When
a speaker makes an offer—non-conditional or conditional—he is committed to the view that
his action will comply with or further, in varying degrees, interests that are not shared by
speaker and hearer.
The third and final difference refers to the presumed absence or existence of a conflict
of interest. When a speaker performs a proposal, he presumes that there is an alignment of
interests with the hearer. By contrast, the speaker who makes an offer (conditional or
otherwise) presupposes the existence of a conflict of interests with the listener. It is not the
presence of a conflict of interest or the presence of a set of shared interests as such that defines
an offer or a proposal, and thus whether the exchange is an instance of negotiation or
deliberation, but whether the action is performed to solve a conflict of interest or to promote
shared interests.
Further, Ihnen Jory differentiates two kinds of negotiation. In a distributive negotiation
the participants assume that what is at stake is the distribution of a fixed amount of some good;
by contrast, integrative negotiations take place when the participants search for a solution
where both can maximize their gains simultaneously. In a distributive negotiation, the offer is
made in order to solve a conflict between the interests of the participants by trying to reach a
compromise somewhere between their interests. In an integrative negotiation, the offer is
performed to solve a conflict between the interests of the participants by trying to fulfil the
parties’ convergent interests, which are neither shared nor in conflict.
What I want to stress is that, according to Ihnen Jory, deliberation differs from
negotiation because it always involves collective action that serves a shared interest and
presupposes a community of interests.
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6. Deliberation and collective agency
Luis Vega agrees with Kock on the distinctive features of public deliberation, even if he does
not dismiss reaching consensus as the proper goal of this argumentative practice (Vega, 2013,
p. 122; 2018, p.4). Summarizing:
1) Deliberation starts from the recognition of an issue of public interest whose resolution
often includes conflicts or alternatives among several possible options or concurrent
parties.
2) Discussion involves proposals, not only propositions.
3) Proposals involve balances and preferences that rest on opposed heterogeneous
considerations with different relative weighs, which may result in complex
multimensional inferences.
4) Proposals, allegations and reasons under consideration are intended to induce the
consensual achievement of results of general interest. The search of consensus
expresses an orientation towards a common interest or goal, apart from or above
personal or private interests of the participants.
5) The goal of the deliberation is to take decision within a specified time: when we engage
in deliberation, it is neither for the pleasure of deliberating, nor to indefinitely defer a
decision.
To develop a consensualist model of deliberative argumentation Vega distinguishes three forms
of argumentative agency, to associate deliberation with collective agency, a notion based on
Toumela’s (2007) We mode. These are individual agency, plural agency and collective agency.
When agency is individual, a commitment is assumed and cancelled by personal choice.
A person is under a personal commitment if and only if she is solely responsible for the
assumed commitment, and she in entitled to cancel the commitment. That is, individual agency
is a mode I of agency.
Plural agency is formed through the association of many individuals by coincidence of
interests or points of view, or by the circumstances of the given situation. Plural agency is then
formed by aggregation of individual agencies. Thus, in plural agency individuals function as a
private person in a group context.
Finally, collective agency results from confrontation of options and public deliberation
in a group acting towards a common goal or towards a joint resolution. It involves strong
commitments that no member of the group is unilaterally entitled to cancel. So, it is a We mode
of agency.
Since argumentation is a communicative interaction that requires the participation of
many agents, argumentative practices may run either with a plural agency or with a collective
agency. In fact, it is tempting to pair these two forms of agency with the two main forms of
practical dialogue or argumentation activity types: negotiation and deliberation, respectively.
This is so because negotiation seems to require plural agency, since interests are particular in
nature, whilst deliberation, as understood by Vega, rests upon the recognition of a common
good, and hence presupposes some form of collective intentionality and agency.
However Vega’s thesis of the collective agency of deliberation can be interpreted either
as the thesis that any exercise of public deliberation requires a collective agency (strong
interpretation), or as the thesis that collective deliberation is a species of the genus public
deliberation, which also includes plural deliberation (weak interpretation). In fact, Vega’s
characterization of public deliberation can be interpreted both ways. Vega says that public
deliberation is characterized, among other things, by the recognition of an issue of common
interest in the public domain, and by the purpose of inducing the consensual and reasonably
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motivated achievement of results of general interest. The terms “common” and “general” may
refer either to every one of the members of the group taken individually, as a species of sum,
or may refer to them as members of a group. Thus a “general interest” may refer to an interest
generalized among the members of the group, or to a group interest, an interest anyone has as
a member of that group.
Vega’s talk of “groups capable of becoming deliberative groups” (Vega, 2018, p.18)
suggests that not all groups are endowed with this capacity, and favors the weak interpretation,
as does the assertion that
A characteristic virtue of public deliberation is just to turn individuals debating about
some resolution into effective members of a collective, and, even more, to turn
individuals affected by a common problem into agents involved in its effective
resolution (Op.cit., p. 26).
But even if we were to adopt a wide interpretation of public deliberation, it seems clear that
Vega holds that collective deliberation is the model for public deliberation, in the double sense
of “model” -i.e., archetype and example for imitation or emulation. In this sense, collective
agency lies at the core of deliberation.
Henceforth, I will reserve “deliberative group” for collective deliberation, using
“deliberative progroup” for plural deliberation (following Tuomela, 2007, p. 46).

7. Deliberation in the We mode
Therefore, participants in collective deliberation do not act as private individuals, but as
members of a group, which entails a certain degree of depersonalization. As it has been stressed
by John Turner in self-categorization theory, depersonalization is not a loss of self, but rather
a redefinition of the self in terms of group membership. Being a member presupposes a
mutually recognized commitment bond to the group ethos and a social commitment to the other
group members relative to promote the group ethos. Hence thinking and acting as a group
member amounts to thinking and acting for a group reason, rather than for an individual reason.
Thinking and acting in the we-mode basically amounts to thinking and acting for a
group reason, that is, to a group member’s taking the group’s views and commitments
as his authoritative reasons for thinking and acting as the group ‘‘requires’’ or in
accordance with what ‘‘favors’’ the group (namely, its goals, etc.). (Tuomela, 2007,
p.14).
Since arguing has been defined presenting to someone something as a reason for something
else, the concept of group reasons seems essential for a proper understanding of collective
deliberation.
Tuomela (2007, p.16) defines the ethos of a group as “the set of the constitutive goals,
values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions that give the group motivating
reasons for action”. The ethos directs the group members’ thoughts and actions toward what is
important for the group and is generally expected to benefit it, and thus defines the common
good. It is just the search of the common good what differentiates deliberation from negotiation
as forms of argumentation, in that the latter is geared towards the reconciliation of private
interests given in advance and independently from the constitution of the group.
It can be assumed, at least to a certain point, that individual agents, and thus plural
agents formed by mere aggregation of them, are given in advance and independently of the
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deliberation process, but it seems that the same does not always hold for collective agents. In
such cases, where does the “we” presupposed as a condition of possibility for collective
deliberation come from? The most plausible answer is that the required “we” is built up during
the course of the deliberation process itself. These considerations lead to the conclusion that
deliberation, and argumentation in general, is also a means of shaping collective identities.
Otherwise, this hypothesis is consistent with Tuomela’s talk of collectively constructed group
reasons (e.g., 2007, p.3).
Robert Asen (2005) ranges identity formation among the important functions
argumentation may play in the public sphere. It is obvious that argumentation, like other
communicative practices, influences how participants understand themselves and the others,
creating for the participants a sense of self and others.
To recognize the identity formation function of argument is to recognize that discourse
situates people in social relations. Argument takes on a performative dimension as the
articulation of a viewpoint bolsters the identity conveyed in one's propositional
statement (Asen, 2005, p. 132).
Although identity -or better, identification- has been given great attention in rhetoric, I would
like to propose a slightly different approach here. I hold that a deliberative group (i.e., groups
capable of becoming collective agents in deliberation) is a group in the sense of Tajfel & Turner
(1986, p.15): “a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same
category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves and
achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and their
membership in it.” If this is so, a deliberative group is defined not only by some shared set of
more or less objective characteristics, but rather by its members’ awareness of belonging to the
same group and the value and emotional significance they attach to this membership. In this
sense, a deliberative group is an emotional community.
A social group exists, and deliberative groups are no exception in this regard, when
individuals recognize each other as members of the same group. This mutual recognition is a
cognitive process that involves a certain depersonalization, since the subject minimizes the
differences within the group (in-group) and magnifies the differences with the opposite groups
(out-groups). When a person categorizes himself as part of a deliberative group, he ceases to
perceive himself as someone unique and different from the rest, with his own particular
interests, and perceives himself as a member of the group. This process is based on the
association of positively valued characteristics with the deliberative in-group (such as
reasonableness), which are supposed to be a distinctive characteristic of the group,
differentiating its members from those that are not, thus generating a feeling of superiority.
A further consequence of the claim that deliberative groups are groups in the sense of
social identity theory is that the sense of belonging to the group, and the fear of being excluded
from it, are part of the “normative cement that serves as a basis for legitimizing, authorizing
and, where appropriate, sanctioning the actions of the members” (Vega, 2018, p.18). It has
been often observed that there is a tendency to debate only with like-minded people (specially
in on-line deliberations), and sometimes this is denounced as a perversion of public reasons.
However, if I am right and deliberation is a means for shaping collective identities, this
tendency is not an accident, but something inscribed in its very nature.
Reasons in collective deliberation are group reasons, reasons constructed for the
members of a group defined by a common ethos and mutual recognition, and, as a result, that
only can be acknowledged by those who recognize themselves and are recognized by the other
members as members of the group. Perhaps it could be said that reasonableness thus becomes,
from the point of view of deliberative agents, an in-group identity marker, instead of a marker
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of the universal audience, which “consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal,
adult persons”, according to Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca (1969, p. 30). Thus, it seems that
acknowledgement of collective deliberation requires abandoning the ideal of universal
audience as a definitory construct of reasonableness.
Kock argues that consensus cannot be the goal of deliberative argumentation, since
weighing reasons is an essential part of it and it requires arranging values into some scale. The
difficulty, according to Kock, is that while we can construct scales using a variety of criteria,
there is no intersubjectively compelling reasons to prioritize one of these over the other. Given
that any balance of reasons in order to take a decision will be done giving the priority to some
particular criterion or set of criteria, deliberation involves a subjective element beyond the
control of argument. If the ethos of a deliberative group is a hierarchical system goals, values,
beliefs, standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions that give the group motivating reasons for
action, the intersubjective validity of the decision reached through deliberation is warranted
into the deliberative group, and so is the possibility of consensus. Of course, this validity and
the corresponding consensus are tied to the identity of the group, and therefore have no
independent standing.

8. Identity negotiation
I would like to suggest further that the process by which the participants come to see themselves
as members of a deliberative group, and to act in consequence, is a process of identity
negotiation (Goffman, 1959; Swann, 1983). Identity negotiation refers to a broad set of
processes through which people strike a balance between achieving their interaction goals and
satisfying their identity-related goals, such as needs for agency, communion and psychological
coherence (Swann & Bosson, 1992, p. 449). Through identity negotiation participants reach
agreements regarding "who is who" in their argumentative exchange. Once these agreements
are reached, participants are expected to remain faithful to the identities they have agreed to
assume. The process of identity negotiation establishes what participants can expect of one
another, and thus provides the interpersonal "glue" that holds relationships together. There are
two competing forces in identity negotiation. On the one hand, every participant tries that the
others verify and confirm her self-conceptions (self-verification); on the other hand, the other
participants try to make her to behave in ways that confirm their expectancies (behavioral
confirmation). If I am right, since identity is situational and negotiated, some moves in a
deliberation dialogue should be properly understood as speaker’s attempts to bring the others
to see him and themselves as members of a group. The very possibility of deliberation depends
on the success of these manoeuvres. Research indicates that when members of small groups
receive self-verification from other group members, their commitment to the group increases
and performance improves (Swann &Buhrmester 2012, p. 414).
In the pragmadialectical model of critical discussion, identity negotiation should be place
at the opening stage. For identity negotiation to fit into the opening stage, a more
comprehensive characterization of this stage is needed. According to the standard account,
In the opening stage the parties decide to try to resolve the difference of opinion. They
assign the roles of protagonist and antagonist (in a mixed difference, there are two
protagonists and two antagonists). They also agree on the rules for the discussion and
on the starting points. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst &Snoeck-Henkemans, 2002, p.
25)
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Here the assigned roles are dialectical roles, regulated by the conventions of the argumentative
exchange and voluntarily assumed by the participants; but when we come to identity
negotiation, identity is the non-conventional result of social interactions, modeled by the
expectancies and behavioral responses of the participants.

9. Conclusion
Deliberation is a type of argumentative practice in which several agents must jointly choose
from several alternatives, that either may be given in advance or may be built in the course of
the dialogue, the best available course of action for the group as a whole. I have argued that in
archetypical deliberation participants act as group members and handle group reasons. Here
“group” means a collection of individuals who share a common identification of themselves.
Acting and perceiving oneself as a group member involves a certain depersonalization, since
the subject ceases to perceive himself as someone unique and different from the rest, with his
or her own particular interests, and perceives himself as a member of the group. A basic
motivation of self-categorization is the pursuit of positive self-esteem, which is achieved
through comparison between the in-group and relevant out-groups. As far as deliberation is
concerned, this process is based on the association of positively valued characteristics such as
reasonableness or open-mindedness with the in-group. In this way, the construction of a group
identity and a collective agency, which is part of the deliberative process itself, allows to
overcome in the search of consensus the subjectivity of the weighing of practical reasons that
is inherent in public deliberation.
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